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Abstract
I introduce habit formation into an otherwise standard overlapping generations econ-
omy with pure exchange populated by three-period-lived agents. Habits are modeled in
such a way that current consumption increases the marginal utility of future consumption.
With logarithmic utility functions, I demonstrate that habit formation may give rise to
stable monetary steady states in economies with hump-shaped endowment pro￿les and
reasonably high discount factors. Intuitively, habits imply adjacent complementarity in
consumption, which in turn helps explain why income e⁄ects are su¢ ciently strong in spite
of logarithmic utility. The longer horizon further strengthens the income e⁄ect. Finally, I
use the bootstrap method to construct stationary sunspot equilibria for those economies
in which the steady state is locally stable.
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Bank of Peru. As usual, all remaining errors are my own.
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11 Introduction
In textbook models of overlapping generations (OLG), sunspot equilibria have been intimately
related to backward bending o⁄er curves and stable monetary steady states (see Blanchard
and Fischer [6]). Theoretically, if income e⁄ects are strong enough, then aggregate savings is a
strictly decreasing function of the real return and the monetary steady state is a sink. In two-
period models equipped with power utility, such income e⁄ects require arguably unrealistic
paramenter speci￿cations (discount factor close to zero, income concentrated in the ￿rst period
of life and high curvature of utility function), which may explain the apparent reluctance of
the profession to embrace the idea of a sunspot equilibrium.
In this paper I introduce habit formation into an otherwise standard three-period-lived
OLG economy, in an attempt to overcome the legitimate concern discussed above. I show that
the steady state is stable when the discount factor is close to one-half, the endowment pro￿le
is hump-shaped and the utility function is logarithmic. Then I use the forward stability of
the steady-state dynamics to construct local sunspot equilibria around the steady state, as in
Spear, Srivastava and Woodford [24].
In light of recent economic developments, the fresh perspective on stability presented in
this paper can also provide an alternative explanation, via the sunspot equilibria, for the excess
volatility that is currently observed, or for the fact that the great moderation in macroeconomic
variability in the U.S. may well be part of an on-going cyclic equilibrium variation1.
I assume that agents derive utility from the gap between current and past consumption.
In presence of subtractive habits not only the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is less
than one at any steady state, but also dated consumption goods are weak gross complements
at yields near the golden rule. I show that the set of economies in which the steady state is a
sink is relatively large when the discount factor is close to zero, but shrinks gradually as the
discount factor approaches one-half. Intuitively, when the discount factor is small enough,
the desire for youth consumption increases, which a⁄ects positively the marginal utility of
consumption in the second stage and fosters adult consumption. This in turn increases the
marginal utility of consumption in the third stage and so on. The adjacent complementarity in
consumption helps explain why income e⁄ects are su¢ ciently strong in spite of the logarithmic
utility.
On the other hand, the longer horizon further strengthens the income e⁄ect and helps
support stable steady states for reasonable values of the discount factor. The intuition is
as follows. When the monetary steady state is stable, the equilibrium sequence of returns
converges to the golden rule via damped oscillations. Note that in the three-period case,
households demand assets when young and middle-aged. If returns are high today, then the
current middle-age agents￿wealth is small, since they received low returns on their savings
1I thank Stephen Spear for this idea.
2yesterday. Consequently, their demand for money is low. This in turn suggests that, even
if the young agents￿demand for money is high because of the high returns, the aggregate
demand for savings can be low because the middle-age agents are constrained by their wealth.
Thus, because of the wealth distribution among di⁄erent generations, the three-period model
possesses a mechanism for causing aggregate asset demand to decrease with the current rate
of return that is completely absent from the two-period model.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the layout of the
model. Section 3 derives the competitive equilibrium. Section 4 deals with the competitive
equilibrium with sunspots. The last section concludes.
Related literature
Under the condition that the monetary steady state is stable, there can be a continuum
of convergent solutions, as well as cyclic solutions. In the former situation, I say that the
competitive equilibrium is indeterminate2. Kehoe and Levine [18] show robust examples of
indeterminacy in three-period-lived OLG economies with outside money if the discount factor
is one-half, income is hump-shaped and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is one
fourth3.
An important property of an intertemporal elasticity of substitution of one-fourth is that
it allows goods in di⁄erent periods to be gross complements at some prices. In situations
where all goods are gross substitutes, Kehoe, Levine, Mas-Colell and Woodford [19] show
that indeterminacy of the type discussed above is impossible.
Theoretical foundations for several versions of intrinsic habit formation have been recently
provided by Rozen [22]. In the OLG framework, habit formation creates room for indetermi-
nacy and is open to a ￿nite number of di⁄erent speci￿cations, with diverse implications on
asset prices. To the best of my knowledge, Lahiri and Puhakka [20] ￿rst incorporate subtrac-
tive habit formation in a two-period OLG model with outside money. They show that cycles
arise when the discount factor is near zero and utility is logarithmic, because generational
o⁄er curves must bend backwards (however, later on in this paper I establish that the o⁄er
curve does not bend backwards in their model).
The current three-period extension of Lahiri and Puhakka [20] is by no means trivial,
as several authors have demonstrated that an economy in which the life cycle goes to three
2On the other hand, Bhattacharya and Russell [5] show that in three-period OLG economies there exist
two-period cycles if the elasticity of substitution is less than one-fourth and income is positive only in the ￿rst
period of life, for any value of the discount factor.
3Unfortunately, it remains di¢ cult to support indeterminate equilibria in multiperiod OLG economies with
pure exchange, outside money and more complex structures. For instance, Azariadis and Lambertini [2] ￿nd
that indeterminacy arises in three-period economies in the presence of endogenous borrowing constraints,
logarithmic utility functions and hump-shaped endowment pro￿les. However, their result is not robust to the
introduction of unproductive assets in positive net supply.
3periods or more may behave di⁄erently from the well-known Diamond model (see for example
Azariadis, Lee and Ohanian [3], Kehoe and Levine [18] and Henriksen and Spear [16]).
I use in this paper the bootstrap method studied by Spear, Srivastava and Woodford [24]
to construct stationary rational expectations equilibria with sunspots, which are known to
exist in OLG models according to the Philadelphia Pholk Theorem4. In the derivation of
these equilibria, I ￿nd that prices depend on lagged endogenous variables, as in Henriksen
and Spear [16]. This result was ￿rst presented by Spear, Srivastava and Woodford [24] in
a two-period model with n > 1 goods and m > 1 agents. The similarity is not surprising,
because the three-period-lived model may also be interpreted as a two-good, two-consumer,
two-period-lived model (see Balasko, Cass and Shell [4] and Kehoe and Levine [18]). In this
paper I stick to the former speci￿cation since it drastically reduces the number of parameters
that are not subject to normalization and therefore the analysis remains as simple as possible.
2 The model
I study a closed, pure-exchange economy of overlapping generations of agents who live for three
periods, labeled as young adulthood, middle age and retirement. There is one individual in
each cohort and no population growth. Time is discrete. In period 1, in addition to the young
consumer, there are two others, an old consumer who lives in period 1 only and a middle-aged
consumer who lives in periods 1 and 2. Agents are allocated exogenous amounts of the unique
consumption good in each period of life. I assume, as in Geanakoplos, Magill and Quinzii
[14], that these endowments are stationary, and the typical young agent￿ s lifetime endowment
is ! = (!1;!2;0) 2 R3
+, which can be interpreted as the agent￿ s labor income (income in
retirement is zero).
Agents are allowed to trade a costlessly storable asset called money to redistribute income
over time. In period 1, the initial old and middle-aged receive ￿xed money endowments ￿ m2;1
and ￿ m3;1, respectively, such that ￿ m2;1 + ￿ m3;1 = ￿ m (young agents receive no endowments of
money). Here, as in the rest of the paper, xi;j denotes the value of x at time j when the agent
is in the i-th stage of life, for i = 1;2;3. The initial young will demand m1;t amounts of money
today and m2;t+1 tomorrow and, as time passes by, both adults and old agents have money
endowments in the amounts carried forward from the previous period. In this economy, the
role of government (or central bank) is to keep the aggregate supply of money ￿xed at ￿ m at
all times.
Lifetime preferences for consumption of a typical young agent are speci￿ed by the following
utility function:
U [c1;t;c2;t+1;c3;t+2] = ln(c1;t) + ￿ ln(c2;t+1 ￿ ￿c1;t) + ￿2 ln(c3;t+2 ￿ ￿c2;t+1) (1)
4It is also possible to construct sunspot equilibria of the Markovian variety ￿rst examined by Azariadis [1].
4where c = (c1;t;c2;t+1;c3;t+2) is the consumption over the life cycle, ￿ 2 (0;1] is the
discount factor and ￿ 2 R+ is the habit parameter. As in Lahiri and Puhakka [20], agents
derive utility from the gap between current and past consumption. Note that habits vanish
completely after one period of twenty years.
I work with subtractive habits in (1), because this representation has several advantages
over the multiplicative version also used in the literature (e.g. Bunzel [8])5. For instante, the
properties of the Hessian of U [c] remain qualitatively intact after the introduction of habits
(in particular, the negative semide￿niteness of the Hessian of U [c]). However, it may be
necessary to impose certain restrictions on the Jacobian of U [c] to prevent the intertemporal
marginal rates of substitution from being negative, as subtractive habit formation may cause
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￿1 ￿ ￿￿ (c3;t+2 ￿ ￿c2;t+1)
￿1
￿ (c3;t+2 ￿ ￿c2;t+1)
￿1 > 0
It turns out that these two conditions can be readily disregarded in this paper, since
the homotheticity of preferences (implied by the logarithmic speci￿cation) is preserved under
subtractive habits (see Bossi and Gomis-Porqueras [7] for an algebraic proof), and hence all
goods remain normal.
Let pt be the price level of the consumption good (I use the price of money as the
numeraire). If conditions (2) hold, then the agent chooses c and money holdings m =
(m1;t;m2;t+1) so as to maximize (1), subject to the sequential budget constraints:
ptc1;t ￿ pt!1 ￿ m1;t
pt+1c2;t+1 ￿ pt+1!2 + m1;t ￿ m2;t+1 (3)
pt+2c3;t+2 ￿ m2;t+1
plus the usual non-negativity constraints on consumption and consumption services (de-
￿ned as ~ c2;t+1 = c2;t+1￿￿c1;t and ~ c3;t+2 = c3;t+2￿￿c2;t+1). Note that in this model m2;t+1 > 0,
because middle-age agents must save to ￿nance consumption when old, but m1;t could be ei-
ther positive (i.e. asset) or negative (i.e. liability). Finally, because U [c] is continuous and
the constrained choice set is compact, the consumer￿ s problem has a solution by a routine
5In the subtractive version, the instantaneous utility function depends on the distance between current
consumption and past consumption; in the multiplicative approach, the utility is a function of the ratio of
current consumption to past consumption.
5application of the Weierstrass theorem.
3 Perfect-foresight equilibrium
In order to build the main argument of the paper, I ￿rst assume that agents have perfect
foresight, which is the rational expectations equilibrium requirement in a deterministic setting.
To begin with, I de￿ne a competitive equilibrium for this economy with outside money. Notice
that in this de￿nition the initial generations have been conveniently disregarded.
De￿nition 1 A monetary competitive equilibrium in this economy is a sequence of consump-
tion bundles fc1;t;c2;t+1;c3;t+2g
1
t=1, money claims fm1;t;m2;t+1g
1
t=1 and prices fptg
1
t=1, such
that: (a) given prices, the agent born at an arbitrary period t maximizes (1) subject to (2)-(3),
plus the usual non-negativity constraints on consumption and consumption services, and (b)
the money market clears 8t, i.e. m1;t + m2;t = ￿ m.
The ￿rst part of the de￿nition can be handled easily by a routine application of the Kuhn-
Tucker theorem under convexity. However, a more direct approach is as follows. I guess that
both ~ c2;t+1 > 0 and ~ c3;t+2 > 0 hold and solve the problem using the Lagrange Theorem. From
the (necessary and su¢ cient) ￿rst-order conditions for an interior optimum, it can be shown
that the unique solution is given by:
c1;t [pt+2;pt+1;pt] =
pt!1 + pt+1!2 ￿
1 + ￿ + ￿2￿









Finally, I verify that (4)-(5) satisfy both (2)-(3), as well as the non-negativity constraints
on consumption and consumption services and hence the initial guess is veri￿ed.
With (4)-(5) I write the market-clearing condition as a non-linear function:
F0 [pt+2;pt+1;pt;pt￿1] = 0
Because preferences are represented by a logarithmic utility function, it is possible to get
a closed-form expression for pt+2. This is the content of the following proposition:
Proposition 1 The perfect-foresight dynamics of prices are described by a third order non-
linear di⁄erence equation of the form:
pt+2 = F1 [pt+1;pt;pt￿1] (6)
Proof. See appendix.
6With this equation at hand, it is convenient to reformulate the original de￿nition of a
competitive equilibrium as follows:
De￿nition 2 A perfect-foresight equilibrium can also be viewed as a forecast function F1
which satis￿es the ￿rst-order conditions (for optimality) and the market-clearing condition.
Now I use (6) to study the existence and uniqueness of a stationary equilibrium, in which
prices (and consumption bundles) remain constant over time. Stationary variables do not
have time subscripts. The results are summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 2 There exists a unique steady-state price p, which satis￿es m1 [p]+m2 [p]￿ ￿ m =
0 for endowment ! which is a monetary equilibrium.
Proof. See appendix.
As is standard in OLG models with perfect foresight, this proposition does not imply
positive aggregate savings in equilibrium. Since the endowment pro￿le attached to each
newborn is ! = (!1;!2;0), adults must save in equilibrium to ￿nance consumption when
old. However, young individuals save if !1 is relatively high, otherwise they prefer to transfer
debt from one generation to another so as to smooth consumption. Therefore, I assume from
now on the following constraint on ! in order to guarantee positive aggregate savings in
equilibrium:
Assumption 1 The endowment ! is such that (2 ￿ ￿)!1 + (1 ￿ ￿)!2 > 0, where ￿ =
(1+￿)(1+￿+￿2)+1+2￿
(1+￿+￿2)(1+￿+￿2)(1+￿), and hence the monetary steady state with equilibrium price p > 0
has aggregate savings equal to ￿ m > 0.
Note that the condition on ! is easily ful￿lled with a low value of !1 when either the
discount factor or the habit parameter is high enough. Intuitively, if young agents become
more patient, then other things equal they are more willing to save out of their endowment.
Also, young agents save more as the habit e⁄ect strengthens, other things equal, as youth
consumption puts a ￿ oor on adult consumption.
Now I convert the third-order di⁄erence equation de￿ned by (6) into a ￿rst-order non-linear
system of the form:
qt+2 = F2 [qt+1]
where qt+1 = (pt+1;pt;pt￿1)































The Hartman-Grobman theorem asserts that if p is a hyperbolic steady state of (6) and
if the Jacobian matrix G is invertible (which is indeed the case since G is full rank), then
there is a neighborhood P of p in which the ￿rst-order Taylor series expansion with Jacobian
matrix G is topologically equivalent to the original non-linear system.
Generically, there is no need to worry about non-hyperbolic equilibria. Given an arbitrary
system xt = F [xt￿1;a] with F [￿;a] 2 C1, the moduli of eigenvalues are continuous functions
of the parameters a. If the steady state of F [￿;a] is non-hyperbolic at a = a0, then generically
any small change in the value of a yields a hyperbolic equilibrium close to the old one, provided
that the steady state itself does not disappear (see de la Fuente [12]).
Let #e denote the number of eigenvales of G whose moduli lie outside the unit circle.
As there are two non-predetermined variables in (6), namely pt+1 and pt, the Blanchard-
Kahn eigenvalue conditions, which are essential to characterize equilibrium dynamics, are
summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 3 (Blanchard-Kahn) Let p be a hyperbolic steady state of (6) and let the
Jacobian matrix G be invertible. If the number of eigenvalues of G whose moduli lie outside
the unit circle is
1. equal to two, then the steady state is locally saddle-path stable, i.e. there exists a unique
competitive equilibrium (determinacy).
2. greater than two, then there is no non-explosive solution satisfying (6).
3. less than two, then the steady state is locally stable, i.e. there is an in￿nity of competitive
equilibria (indeterminacy).
In the presence of habit formation, an economy is completely characterized by the follow-
ing set of parameters (!1;!2;￿;￿). I assume that ￿ 2 [0;1], because the habit parameter
typically belongs to the unit interval in the calibration exercises performed by Bossi and
Gomis-Porqueras [7]. I further assume that !1 + !2 = 1, without loss of generality, since
homotheticity is preserved under subtractive habit persistence. With these simpli￿cations, an
economy can be represented by a triplet (!1;￿;￿) 2 [0;1] ￿ [0;1] ￿ (0;1].
In Figure 1, I depict the (!1;￿) Cartesian plane for four possible values of ￿, and assess the
stability properties of every hyperbolic equilibrium, following the Blanchard-Kahn eigenvalue
8conditions:
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Figure 1. Stability properties of the monetary steady state for di⁄erent parameter
con￿gurations (!1;1 ￿ !1;￿;￿) and ￿ 2 f0:1;0:2;0:4;0:5g. At every steady state,
indeterminacy occurs when there is more than one stable eigenvalue, determinacy occurs
when there is one stable eigenvalue, instability occurs when there is less than one stable
eigenvalue and, ￿nally, no outside money equilibrium means that Assumption 1 is not
satis￿ed.
First of all, the discount factor is smaller than in representative-agent models. These
values are not implausible, however, because each period in OLG models of this sort typically
consists of 20 years. For example, Kehoe and Levine [18] and Geanakoplos, Magill and Quinzii
[14] set the discount factor to 0:5 = (0:96594)20, while Constantinides, Donaldson and Mehra
[11] assume the discount factor is 0:44.
The routine builds G at every possible coordinate pair in the grid, conditional on Assump-
tion 1 being satis￿ed, and then calculates #e. Since F1 is provided explicitly in the appendix,
the exact elements of G are computed in each round.
There are four di⁄erent colors in each panel of ￿gure one: light gray, gray, dark gray and
white. It is well known that if the original equilibrium is hyperbolic, then small changes in
￿ do not take the moduli of eigenvalues across the boundary of the unit circle. However, in
9Figure 1 there are small perturbations of ￿ near certain critical values that change the nature
of the steady state. Then, bifurcations as de￿ned by Guckenheimer and Holmes [15] occur at
non-hyperbolic equilibria in this model.
To begin with, notice that all economies located in the light gray area do not admit a
steady state with positive aggregate savings. In these economies, the assumption on the
endowment pro￿le ! is not met. As expected, equilibria with outside money are not well
de￿ned when the endowment of the young is low enough.
In the gray area, the steady state is unstable as #e = 3. However, this case may be
disregarded because instability requires that !1 > !2, which is at odds with what is observed
in reasonable calibration exercises. Conversely, the stationary economies located in the dark
gray areas are locally saddle-path stable, because #e = 2. Azariadis, Lee and Ohanian [3]
show that if habits are absent in a model like mine, then this is the only possible outcome.
The introduction of habit persistence, nevertheless, makes the steady state locally stable
in all economies located in the white areas, as #e < 2. Indeterminate equilibria are consistent
with hump-shaped endowment pro￿les and reasonably high discount factors. In particular, the
economy characterized by ￿ ￿ (!1;!2;!3;￿;￿) = (0:1;0:9;0;0:5;0:4) satis￿es the eigenvalue
criterion6. Thus I have proved the following proposition:
Proposition 4 For a non-empty, open set of economies satisfying Assumption 1, there exists
a neighborhood P of p such that the map F2 is a contraction on P(p) ￿ P(p) ￿ P(p).
Origins of indeterminacy: Interpretation
First, it is convenient to discuss the behavior of the o⁄er curve. Let At = ￿1;t + ￿2;t denote
aggregate savings, where (￿1;t;￿2;t+1) = (m1;t=pt;m2;t+1=pt+1) represent the assets held by
the young and middle-aged at the end of periods t and t+1, respectively. Typically, the o⁄er
curve uses the market-clearing condition to relate At+1 to At in the (At;At+1) plane. Now
the asset market clears when At = ￿ m=pt or At+1 = RtAt, where Rt = pt=pt+1 is the gross rate
of return7.
Notice that the set of economies in which the steady state is a sink is relatively large
when the discount factor is close to zero, but disappears gradually as the discount factor
approaches one-half. Intuitively, when the discount factor is small enough, the desire for
youth consumption increases, which a⁄ects positively the marginal utility of consumption in
the second stage and fosters adult consumption. This in turn increases the marginal utility
of consumption in the third stage and so on. Put it di⁄erently, indeterminacy arises when
6This parameterization suggests that agents get 90 percent of their lifetime income when middle-aged. In
the literature, it is possible to encounter similar speci￿cations, for instance, if agents earn labor income only
in the second period of their life, as in Jappelli and Pagano [17].
7As in Blanchard and Fischer [6], a monetary equilibrium could be de￿ned, in principle, without direct
reference to the stock of currency.
10agents are impatient and dated consumption goods become weak gross complements at yields
near the golden rule.
The longer horizon adds an additional e⁄ect on the aggregate saving function. Because of
Proposition 4, there is an open set of economies in which the o⁄er curve crosses the 45-degree
line from below with a slope between ￿1 and 0, such that At = At+1 = A > 0. This means
that the equilibrium sequences of returns converge to the monetary steady state via damped
oscillations, as the slope of any straight line that goes through the origin equals Rt. That is,
returns switch between high and low and converge to 1.
Now suppose returns are high at t. Hence the current middle-age agents￿wealth is small,
as they received low returns on their savings at t￿1. Consequently, their demand for money
is low at time t. Therefore, even if the young agents￿ s demand for money is high because of
the high returns, the aggregate demand for savings can be low because the middle-aged are
constrained by their wealth. Thus, with longer time horizon, there is more room to derive a
downward sloping aggregate saving function because of the wealth distribution among di⁄erent
generations (a comprehensive explanation of this channel can be found in Battacharya and
Russell [5]). This mechanism is completely absent from the two-period model.
Furthermore, this new mechanism supports stable steady states for reasonable values of
the discount factor. When the discount factor is relatively high, young households save almost
all their corresponding endowment regardless of the rate of return, so their demand for savings
becomes more inelastic to the rate of return. But since the new transmission channel is strong,
indeterminacy persists for values of the discount factor of the order of one-half.
As explained above, indeterminacy means that in the neighborhood of a stable steady state
there is an in￿nite number of convergent price sequences. This feature of forward stability
will be used to construct stationary sunspot equilibria in the next section.
Two-period economies
In this subsection I revisit brie￿ y the model originally posed in Lahiri and Puhakka [20],
inhabited by two-period-lived agents. If ￿t stands for the savings of the young, then in
any competitive equilibrium the asset market clears when ￿t+1 = Rt￿t. Di⁄erentiating this
expression I get @￿t+1=@￿t = Rt (1 + 1=￿), where ￿ = (d￿=dR)(R=￿). For indeterminacy to
occur, I need ￿ < ￿0:5 at the steady state. As before, an economy can be represented by a
11triplet (!1;￿;￿) 2 [0;1] ￿ [0;1] ￿ (0;1]. I depict in Figure 2 my results:
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Figure 2. Stability properties of the steady state, for di⁄erent parameter con￿gurations
(!1;1 ￿ !1;￿;￿) and ￿ 2 f0:01;0:02;0:04;0:1g. At every steady state, indeterminacy occurs
when the elasticity of savings with respect to the real rate of return, evaluated at the steady
state, is less than minus one-half; determinacy occurs when the elasticity is greater than
minus one-half and, ￿nally, no outside money equilibrium means that a condition similar to
Assumption 1 is not satis￿ed.
Unlike the case with 3 periods, now income should be heavily concentrated in the early
parts of the life cycle and the discount factor should be very low for indeterminacy to occur.
It is also evident that indeterminacy is not monotonic in the habit parameter. In order
to study this phenomenon, I derive the o⁄er curve a la Cass, Okuno and Zilcha [9] when
(!1;!2;￿;￿) = (0:95;0:05;￿;0:1) and ￿ 2 f0:1;0:4;0:7g. The o⁄er curve can be represented
as ￿t = g(￿t+1), using backward dynamics8.
8See the appendix for details on the derivation of the o⁄er curve.



















g = 0.1, m = -2.6544
g = 0.4, m = -0.96424
g = 0.7, m = -1.1464
Figure 3. O⁄er curve associated to OLG economies with two-period-lived agents
when (!1;!2;￿) = (0:95;0:05;0:1). The habit parameter ￿ takes three di⁄erent
values, and m stands for the value of the slope of the o⁄er curve when it crosses
the 45-degree line.
As shown in Figure 3, the o⁄er curve is surjective (there are two values of ￿t consistent
with ￿t+1 = 0), and hence discontinuous. The o⁄er curve is negatively sloped and, most
importantly, the slope of the curve at the steady state is less than one in absolute value when
￿ = 0:4, but greater than one when ￿ is either 0:1 or 0:7. Unlike the standard case with power
utility and low elasticity of substitution, the steady state is stable even though the o⁄er curve
does not bend backwards (as stated incorrectly in Lahiri and Puhakka [20]). Since the higher
the habit parameter, the ￿ atter the o⁄er curve, it is clear that indeterminacy may not be
monotonic in the habit parameter.
With two periods, households only accumulate savings when young (if any). When the
discount factor is low, they desire to consume in the ￿rst period of life. But in presence of
habit formation, consumption when young increases the marginal utility of consumption when
old. Consequently, their initial willingness to save is high, so an increase in the rate of return
produces a non-negligible raise in the level of savings. However, the income e⁄ect acts in the
opposite direction. If the net e⁄ect of these two forces is strong enough to produce a decrease
in the level of savings, and the o⁄er curve intersects the 45-degree line with a slope less than
one in absolute value, then there is indeterminacy.
134 Rational expectations equilibrium
An alternative interpretation of Proposition 4 is that there is a set of economies in which
neither preferences nor endowments may help determine the actual outcome at any period t.
Unfortunately, habit formation may undermine the concept of perfect foresight equilibrium
and in this scenario, agents rely on an extrinsic random variable, or sunspot variable, which
conveys useful information for forecasting equilibrium prices.
To construct an equilibrium, following Spear, Srivastava and Woodford [24], I ￿rst study
the problem faced by the agent in the last period of life (i.e. backward dynamic programming).
I consider stochastic economies close to a deterministic economy satisfying Proposition 4.
Loosely speaking, I will be looking for a stationary forecast process satisfying some optimality
conditions, together with an invariant measure for the process de￿ned by the forecast function,
that is, the stochastic counterpart of De￿nition 2 (a formal de￿nition is provided in De￿nition
3).





pt+2c3;t+2 ￿ pt+2!3 + m2;t+1
Let ￿2[m2;t+1;c1;t;c2;t+1;pt+2] be the associated multiplier. Now, in the second period of
life, the agent thinks of future prices as functions of f"tg, a sequence of bounded, independent
and identically distributed random variables, with distribution given by the measure ￿. The
agent also knows that   is the induced probability measure of period t + 2 prices. When




U [c1;t;c2;t+1;c3;t+2[m2;t+1;c1;t;c2;t+1;pt+2]]d  [pt+2]
subject to
pt+1c2;t+1 ￿ pt+1!2 ￿ m2;t+1 + m1;t
The ￿rst-order conditions for this problem are:
R
D2U [c1;t;c2;t+1;c3;t+2[m2;t+1;c1;t;c2;t+1;pt+2]]d  [pt+2] ￿ ￿1pt+1 = 0
￿1 ￿
R
￿2[m2;t+1;c1;t;c2;t+1;pt+2]d  [pt+2] = 0 (7)
pt+1z2;t+1 + m2:t+1 ￿ m1;t = 0
where z2;t+1 = c2;t+1 ￿ !2. The implementation of a stationary sunspot equilibrium
makes use of the bootstrapping method, which consists of replacing the stochastic ￿rst order
14conditions with equations in which there is one deterministic component and one random
component. Hence I rewrite the conditions as:
D2U [c1;t;c2;t+1;c3;t+2[m2;t+1;c1;t;c2;t+1;pt+2]] ￿ ￿1pt+1 ￿ "c;t+2 = 0
￿1 ￿ ￿2[m2;t+1;c1;t;c2;t+1;pt+2] ￿ "￿;t+2 = 0 (8)
pt+1z2;t+1 + m2;t+1 ￿ m1;t = 0
where "t+2 = ("c;t+2;"￿;t+2) is an R2-valued random variable drawn independently each
period from a distribution ￿ such that
R
"d￿["] = 0. Equations (8) imply (7). Now I substitute
from the budget constraint for c2;t+1 in the ￿rst two equations. Then I substitute from the
multiplier equations for ￿1 in the ￿rst equation. This yields:
D2U [c1;t;m2;t+1;c3;t+2[m1;t;c1;t;m2;t+1;pt+1;pt+2]]
￿￿2[m1;t;c1;t;m2;t+1;pt+1;pt+2]pt+1 ￿ "￿;t+2pt+1 ￿ "c;t+2 = 0 (9)
Note that with m1;t and c1;t given, pt+1 = pt+2 = p, and "t+2 = 0, this equation will have a
solution m2. Now I wish to solve this equation for pt+2 as a function of (m1;t;c1;t;m2;t+1;pt+1;"t+2)
on a neighborhood of (m1;t;c1;t;m2;p;0). In order to apply the implicit function theorem, I
need the derivative:
J = D23UDpt+2c3;t+2 ￿ pt+1Dpt+2￿2
to be non-zero. For generic utility functions, Spear, Srivastava and Woodford [24] argue
that this is the case.
Proposition 5 For an open and dense set of utility functions satisfying the maintained as-
sumptions, J is non-zero at (m1;t;c1;t;m2;p;0).
Proof. See Spear, Srivastava and Woodford [24, Lemma 4.1].
Given this result, it is possible to write:
pt+2 = H1 [m1;t;c1;t;m2;t+1;pt+1;"t+2] (10)
such that H1, D3H1 and D4H1 are all continuous functions of (m1;t;c1;t;m2;t+1;pt+1;"t+2).
As in Spear [23], I assume that the realization of "t+2 and determination of pt+2 during period
t+2 are simultaneous. Now the agent takes this forecast function as given, together with the
distribution ￿ for " and generate demands c2;t+1 [m1;t;c1;t;m2;t+1;pt+1;￿] and shadow prices
￿1 [m1;t;c1;t;m2;t+1;pt+1;￿].





U [c1;t;c2;t+1 [m1;t;c1;t;m2;t+1;pt+1;￿];c3;t+2[m1;t;c1;t;m2;t+1;pt+1;H1;￿]]d  [pt+1]
subject to
ptc1;t + m1;t ￿ pt!1
The ￿rst-order conditions for this problem are:
R
D1U [c1;t;c2;t+1 [￿];c3;t+2[￿]]d  [pt+1] ￿ ￿0pt = 0
￿0 ￿
R
￿1 [￿]d  [pt+1] = 0 (11)
ptz1;t + m1;t = 0
where z1;t = c1;t￿!1; (￿) = (m1;t;c1;t;m2;t+1;pt+1;￿) and (￿) = (m1;t;c1;t;m2;t+1;pt+1;H1;￿).
It is worth mentioning that H1 does not depend on "t+2, as it has been integrated out. Now
I replace the above equations by:
D1U [c1;t;c2;t+1 [￿];c3;t+2[￿]] ￿ ￿0pt ￿ "c;t+1 = 0
￿0 ￿ ￿1 [￿] ￿ "￿;t+1 = 0 (12)
ptz1;t + m1;t = 0
Equations (12) imply (11). As before, I substitute from the budget constraint for c1;t in
the ￿rst two equations. Next I substitute from the multiplier equations for ￿0 in the ￿rst
equation. This yields:
D1U [m1;t;c2;t+1 [m1;t;m2;t+1;pt;pt+1;￿];c3;t+2[m1;t;m2;t+1;pt;pt+1;H1 [m1;t;m2;t+1;pt;pt+1];￿]]
￿￿1 [m1;t;m2;t+1;pt;pt+1;￿]pt ￿ "￿;t+1pt ￿ "c;t+1 = 0(13)
Note that at pt = pt+1 = p, and "t+1 = 0, this equation will have a solution m1. Now I
wish to solve this equation for pt+1 as a function of (m1;t;m2;t+1;pt;"t+1) on a neighborhood
of (m1;m2;p;0). Let ￿t+1 = (m1;t;m2;t+1). As in the previous case, in order to apply the
implicit function theorem I need the derivative:







to be non-zero. Hence by an argument similar to that used above, it can be shown that J0
is also non-zero generically. Then this equation can be solved for pt+1 on a neighborhood of







When I plug (14) into (10), and incorporate the relevant budget constraint, I get the






Given this result, there exist neighborhoods M1 of ￿, P0, P1 of p, and N1 of 0 such that
(15) has a unique solution pt+2 2 P0 for each choice of ￿t+1 2 M1, pt 2 P1, as well as "t+1 and
"t+2 2 N1. Now let agents take this forecast function as given, together with the distribution









Finally, since m1;t = ￿ptz1;t and m2;t+1 = ￿pt+1z2;t+1 ￿ptz1;t, the market-clearing condi-









￿ ￿ m = 0 (16)
Hence by an argument similar to that used before to establish that J and J0 are gener-
ically non-zero, it can be shown that this equation can be solved generically for ￿t+2 on a
neighborhood of the non-stochastic steady state values p, ￿, " = 0 and ￿ = ￿ ￿. Formally I
obtain the following result:
Proposition 6 For an open and dense set of utility functions, equations (9), (13) and (16)
can be solved for ￿t+2. Speci￿cally for any function in that set, there exist neighborhoods
P2 ￿ P1 of p, M0 and M2 ￿ M1 of ￿, and N2 ￿ N1 of 0, and an ￿ > 0, such that (9),
(13) and (16) have a unique solution ￿t+2 2 M0, for each choice of pt 2 P2, "t+1, "t+2 2 N2,






is such that G1, D1G1 and D2G1 are all continuous functions of ￿t+1, p, "t+1 and "t+2.
Proof. See Spear, Srivastava and Woodford [24, Lemma 4.2].
In order to complete the characterization of the equilibrium, I consider again the forecast
and allocations functions. Clearly there are lagged allocations (allocation state variables) in









17In what follows, I will show that it is convenient to express the forecast function solely in
terms of lagged prices and random variables. As in Spear, Srivastava and Woodford [24], I
invert the forecast function and solve for a function:
￿t+1 = H3 [pt+2;pt;"t+1;"t+2]
When I substitute this expression into the expression for ￿t+2 (the allocation function) I
get:
￿t+2 = G2 [pt+2;pt;"t+1;"t+2]
Lagging this one period gives:
￿t+1 = G2 [pt+1;pt￿1;"t;"t+1]
Substituting for ￿t+1 in the forecast function H2 then yields:
pt+2 = H4 [pt+1;pt;pt￿1;"t;"t+1;"t+2] (17)
which is a continuous function in the ￿rst ￿ve arguments and a measurable function of
the ￿fth argument. Proposition 4 implies that in the case of "t = "t+1 = "t+2 = 0, ￿ = ￿ ￿
(the measure that puts all mass on "t = "t+1 = "t+2 = 0), the non-stochastic dynamics are
contracting in a neighborhood of the steady state p. By continuity, H4 is a contraction for "t,
"t+1 and "t+2 su¢ ciently close to zero and ￿ su¢ ciently close to ￿ ￿.
At this point it is useful to de￿ne the rational expectations equilibrium.
De￿nition 3 A stationary rational expectations equilibrium is a pair (H4;￿) such that H4 is
a stationary forecast process satisfying the stochastic ￿rst-order conditions and the market-
clearing condition and ￿ is an invariant measure for the Markov process de￿ned by H4. The
rational expectations equilibrium is non-trivially stochastic if the function H4 depends non-
trivially on the random variable "t+2.
As before, the third-order di⁄erence equation de￿ned by H4 is converted into a ￿rst-order


















A = ^ H4 [pt+1;pt;pt￿1;"t;"t+1;"t+2]
or, alternatively, qt+2 = ^ H4 [qt+1;"t;"t+1;"t+2], where qt+1 = (pt+1;pt;pt￿1)
0. Then, ^ H4
together with the measure ￿ describe a stationary Markov process for (qt+1;"t;"t+1) with
18support P3(p)3 ￿ N3(0)2, with P3 ￿ P2 \ P0 and N3 ￿ N2. Since ^ H4 is a contraction, it
may well be assumed that this support is compact. Now it is left to show that there is an
invariant measure ￿ for this process.
As in Spear, Srivastava and Woodford [24], I consider any continuous function Q[qt+2;"t+1;"t+2]









As ^ H4 is continuous in its ￿rst three arguments, the transition operator T (which is applied
on the function Q) plainly takes continuous functions into continuous functions. Hence, by
Rosenblatt [21, Theorem IV.3.1], there exists an invariant measure for the stationary Markov
process de￿ned by ^ H4 and the measure ￿.
It turns out that the pair (H4;￿) stands for a rational expectations equilibrium. Since the
random variable "t+2 is non-degenerate by assumption, the agents￿forecasts are non-trivially
stochastic. Thus I have proved the following proposition:
Proposition 7 Under Proposition 4, there exists a non-empty, open set of economies exhibit-
ing non-trivial stationary rational expectations equilibria (H4;￿) in state variables (pt+1;pt;pt￿1;"t;"t+1)
for ￿ su¢ ciently close to ￿ ￿.
Therefore, in principle there is no causal connection between the sunspots and prices,
except through agents￿forecasts, an argument originally put forward by Spear [23].
Two-period economies revisited
In the general multiple commodity model or in three-period-lived models, the allocation vari-
ables cannot be eliminated through the budget constraints and hence play a non-trivial role in
determining the form of the equilibrium. However, in two-period-lived models it is possible to
eliminate the allocations from the equilibrium price function via the money market clearing
and the two budget constraints.
The proof is straightforward. First of all, the money market clearing condition requires
mt = ￿ m for all t, and thus the sequential budget constraints may be rewritten as:
c1;t ￿ !1 ￿
￿ m
pt
, and c2;t+1 ￿ !2 +
￿ m
pt+1

























￿ "t+1 = 0
19This equation can be readily solved for pt+1 = F(pt;"t+1). Under conditions similar to
Proposition 4, the forecast function is consistent with stationary sunspot equilibria.
5 Concluding remarks
I show that indeterminacy may arise in three-period-lived OLG economies with reasonable
values of the discount factor and hump-shaped endowment pro￿les even if the utility function
is logarithmic, provided that subtractive habit formation is allowed for. When the steady
state becomes locally stable, it is possible to construct sunspot equilibria.
It would be straightforward to assume that !3 is positive (but relatively small), in which
case the results presented in this paper would hold by means of a continuity argument. Fur-
thermore, if I relied on more general power utility functions beyond the logarithmic case, I
would obtain local stability with a higher elasticity of substitution than what is needed in
traditional models (see Grandmont [13]). A larger number of periods would just reinforce the
income e⁄ect.
The approach presented in this paper complements the huge literature on general equilib-
rium that argues that indeterminacy helps arbitrary self-ful￿lling beliefs become a source of
volatility, even when preferences or endowments are not random. Even though the literature
on extrinsic uncertainty has always highlighted the role of sunspot variables as coordination
devices, the theory developed here is unable to identify the way in which market participants
coordinate their expectations and consequent decisions. In other settings, however, it is possi-
ble to grasp such relationship, for example, Du⁄y and Fisher [10] present direct evidence from
a controlled experiment on how buyers and sellers in a double action use a sunspot variable
as a coordination mechanism. I believe this is a promising direction of research.
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22Appendix
A Proofs
Proof of proposition 1. Note that m1;t [pt+2;pt+1;pt] = pt!1￿ptc1;t, and m2;t [pt+1;pt;pt￿1] =
pt￿1!1 + pt!2 ￿ (pt￿1c1;t￿1 + ptc2;t), where c1;t and c2;t+1 are de￿ned as (4) and (5), respec-
tively.
The market-clearing condition can be written as:
m1;t [pt+2;pt+1;pt] = ￿ m ￿ m2;t [pt+1;pt;pt￿1]
pt!1 ￿
pt (pt!1 + pt+1!2)
￿
1 + ￿ + ￿2￿
(pt + ￿pt+1 + ￿2pt+2)






￿pt (pt!1 + pt+1!2)
pt!1 + m2;t [pt+1;pt;pt￿1] ￿ ￿ m




1 + ￿ + ￿2￿￿1. Clearly, this last expression can be written as pt+2 = F1 [pt+1;pt;pt￿1].
Proof of proposition 2. At any stationary equilibrium, pt = p. Then,
m1 [p] = p(!1 ￿ c1)
where c1 = (!1 + !2)
￿￿
1 + ￿ + ￿2￿￿
1 + ￿ + ￿2￿￿￿1. In the same fashion,
m2 [p] = p((!1 + !2) ￿ (1 + (1 + ￿)￿ + ￿=(1 + ￿))c1)
The market clearing condition is m1 [p] + m2 [p] = ￿ m, or:




Solving out for p yields:
p = (!1 (2 ￿ ￿) + !2 (1 ￿ ￿))
￿1 ￿ m
Clearly, the steady-state price is positive if either ￿ m > 0 and (!1 (2 ￿ ￿) + !2 (1 ￿ ￿)) > 0,
or ￿ m < 0 and (!1 (2 ￿ ￿) + !2 (1 ￿ ￿)) < 0.
23B Derivation of o⁄er curve
Let Rt = pt=pt+1. The excess demand function when old is:
￿t+1 = c2;t+1 ￿ !2




(1 + ￿)(Rt + ￿)
=
Rt [￿!1 ￿ !2 + ￿!1 (Rt + ￿)]
(1 + ￿)(Rt + ￿)
where the second and third lines use ￿t+1 = Rt￿t and c1;t = (!1Rt + !2)(1 + ￿)
￿1 (Rt + ￿)
￿1,
respectively. The last expression can be written as:
0 = ￿2R2
t + ￿1Rt + ￿0
where ￿2 = ￿!1, ￿1 = (1 + ￿)￿!1 ￿ !2 ￿ (1 + ￿)￿t+1, and ￿0 = ￿(1 + ￿)￿￿t+1. From









By Descarte￿ s rule of signs, there is only one positive root ~ R+ (because ￿2 > 0, ￿0 < 0











~ R+ + ￿
￿
The o⁄er curve is the locus of points (￿t;￿t+1).
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